PLANS TO RETAKE THE PHILIPPINES

PLANS TO RETAKE THE PHILIPPINES

Preliminary Discussion

Behind the decision to go into Leyte lay a series of strategically significant victories, which had followed a staggering initial reverse. American prewar plans for the Pacific had originally been based on the assumption that only the United States and Japan would be at war and that the U.S. Pacific Fleet would be in existence.2 But the destruction of the fleet at Pearl Harbor and the entrance of Germany and Italy into the war nullified these plans. The strategy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff3 in early 1942, therefore, was concerned chiefly with trying to limit the rapid advance of the Japanese and with keeping the line of communications to Australia open. The Pacific Theater was divided into command areas—the Southwest Pacific Area, with General Douglas MacArthur as [2]Supreme Commander (he referred to himself, however, as Commander in Chief), and the Pacific Ocean Area (which included the Central Pacific), with Admiral Chester W. Nimitz as Commander in Chief.4

In 1942 and 1943 the Allied forces had halted the Japanese at Papua and Guadalcanal and started to push them back. On 8 May 1943 the Joint Chiefs approved a “Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan,” which was endorsed by the Combined Chiefs in December. The objective of the plan was to secure the unconditional surrender of Japan, an objective that might necessitate an invasion of the Japanese home islands. As such an invasion promised to be a “vast undertaking,” it would be necessary to secure a large supply base from which a great aerial offensive could be mounted against Japan. According to the original plan this base was to be located in China, but the Mariana Islands were afterward substituted for China. The plan called for the acquisition of successive island bases which could be used as “steppingstones,” preferably those which would shorten the sea route, provide for its security, and at the same time deny to the Japanese bases from which they might interfere with the Allied line of communications. The main effort was to be through the waters of the Pacific Ocean. Nimitz’ operations were to be conducted west through the Japanese mandated islands while MacArthur’s proceeded northwest along the New Guinea coast. The two series of operations were to be mutually supporting.5

Although no specific islands were named in the Strategic Plan, the Philippine Archipelago, because of its strategic position and long possession by the United States, naturally loomed large in the planning. The Philippines lie athwart all sea routes south from Japan to the economically important Netherlands Indies—rich in rubber, tin, oil, and rice. The capture of the Philippines would help to sever this line of communications and would furnish an excellent staging area for attacks against China, Formosa, or Japan. Aside from strategic considerations, the liberation of the Islands was important for reasons of Far Eastern politics and prestige.6 The obligation of the United States to the subjugated Filipino people could not be lightly ignored. Furthermore, General MacArthur was imbued with a burning determination to return to the Philippine Islands and avenge the humiliating defeats suffered by the American forces in 1941 and 1942.

By the spring of 1944 the operations in the Pacific were going so well that the successes had exceeded even the most optimistic hopes of any of the planning officers. On 12 March the Joint Chiefs ordered General MacArthur to prepare plans for a return to Mindanao, southernmost island of the Philippines, with a target date of 15 November 1944.7 General MacArthur on 15 June issued a plan for his future operations. The entrance into the Philippines was to be accomplished in two phases. The first would be a preliminary operation on 25 [3]October into the Sarangani Bay area in southern Mindanao in order to establish land-based air forces to augment the carrier-based air support for the principal effort. The major effort was to be an amphibious landing operation with forces mounted from New Guinea for the seizure on 15 November of airfields and bases on Leyte.8 The latter was to follow quickly on the heels of the first operation in order to take full advantage of the surprise tactics.

Leyte occupies a commanding position in the Philippine Islands. Because of its central location, its repossession by the United States would not only divide the Japanese forces in the Philippines but would also provide an excellent anchorage in Leyte Gulf, together with sites for bases and airfields from which land-based aircraft could bomb all parts of the Philippines, the coast of China, and Formosa. To an even greater extent than Mindanao, Leyte could be made into an excellent springboard from which to launch subsequent operations against the Japanese in Formosa or in the rest of the Philippines.

On 1 September 1944 the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their 171st meeting reviewed the situation in the Pacific. The time had come when it was necessary to issue a directive for future operations in that area. After much discussion, the Joint Chiefs left in abeyance the question of what operation should follow Leyte but “directed the Joint Staff Planners to prepare, as a matter of urgency, a directive to the Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, and the Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, to carry out the Leyte operation.”29

Accordingly, on 8 September, the two commanders were given the following missions: General MacArthur, after conducting the necessary preliminary operations, was to take the Leyte-Surigao area on 20 December, with Admiral Nimitz furnishing fleet support and additional assault shipping. Both commanders were to arrange for co-ordination of plans and mutual support of operations; to co-ordinate plans with General Joseph W. Stilwell, Commanding General, United States Army forces, China, Burma and India, in order to get maximum support from that theater; and to arrange with General Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force, for supporting operations.30

Concurrently with the issuance of this directive, momentous events were taking place in the Pacific. Admiral Halsey was in command of scheduled operations against the Palau Islands. On 7 and 8 September aircraft from his carriers struck at Yap and the Palau Islands, against which Admiral Nimitz had scheduled operations, and for the next two days bombed Mindanao. On the 12th and 14th the bombers hit the central Philippines in support of the operations against the Palau Islands and Morotai.

Admiral Halsey advised Admiral Nimitz that, as a result of the strikes, few serviceable planes in the Philippines were left to the Japanese, the bulk of the enemy’s oil supplies was destroyed, there was “no shipping left to sink,” the “enemy’s non-aggressive attitude [was] unbelievable and fantastic,” and “the area is wide open.”31 Halsey also told Nimitz that one of his downed carrier pilots had been told by his Filipino rescuers that there were no Japanese on Leyte.32 He therefore felt that it was time to accelerate the operations in the Pacific, and he strongly recommended that the intermediate operations—Yap, [9]Talaud, and the Sarangani Bay area on Mindanao—be canceled. Leyte could be seized immediately and cheaply without any intermediate operations. Halsey’s fleet could cover the initial landing until land-based aircraft could be established. The force intended for the occupation of Yap could be made available to General MacArthur.33

When this message was received, the Combined Chiefs of Staff were attending a conference in Quebec. The recommendations were transmitted to Quebec by Admiral Nimitz, who offered to place at MacArthur’s disposal the III Amphibious Force, including the XXIV Corps, which was loading at Pearl Harbor for Yap. General Marshall so informed General MacArthur and asked his opinion on the proposed change of target date.34

The message reached MacArthur’s headquarters at Hollandia, on New Guinea, while MacArthur was en route to Morotai and observing radio silence. His chief of staff advised General Marshall that although the information from the rescued pilot that there were no Japanese on Leyte was incorrect, the intermediate operations could be eliminated. The 1st Cavalry Division and the 24th Infantry Division with sufficient service troops were available for the Leyte operation; adequate air strength could be provided; the logistic support was practicable; and the XXIV Corps could be used.35

General Marshall received this answer at Quebec on 15 September while he, Admiral Leahy, Admiral King, and General Arnold were at a formal dinner given by Canadian officers. The Americans withdrew from the table for a conference. Within an hour and a half after the message arrived, the Joint Chiefs ordered MacArthur and Nimitz to cancel the three intermediate operations of Yap, Talaud, and Sarangani, co-ordinate their plans, and invade Leyte on 20 October.36

Later that evening, as he was on his way to his quarters after the dinner, General Marshall received this message: “Subject to completion of arrangements with Nimitz, we shall execute Leyte operation on 20 October.... MacArthur.”37

On 3 October the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed General MacArthur to occupy Luzon on 20 December 1944, the date originally set for the entrance into Leyte.38 The decision had been made. General MacArthur was to return to the Philippine Islands in force.

Japanese defense to maintain its hold of the Philippines

Japanese defense to maintain its hold of the Philippines

The Japanese undertook the defense of Leyte with serene assurance. Their pilots had erroneously reported the naval battle off Formosa as a great victory and declared that only remnants of the once strong American Navy remained. The defeatist attitude of the summer of 1944 vanished.

During the summer there had been disagreement among the Japanese military leaders. Imperial General Headquarters felt that the decisive battle should be fought on Luzon and only delaying actions taken in other areas. To this the 14th Area Army agreed. The Southern Army, on the other hand, believed that it would be impossible to wage a successful battle on Luzon if other areas, especially the Visayan Islands, were allowed to fall into American hands. Since these islands, if captured, could be used as Allied air bases, the decisive battle should be fought whenever and wherever the Americans attacked.1

Confident that the U. S. fleet had suffered grievously in the battle off Formosa, the Japanese closed ranks and all the commands agreed that the time was most opportune to deliver the coup de grâce. The foolhardy Americans would take a severe drubbing, and Japan, after a long series of humiliating and costly defeats, would regain the initiative. It was therefore a jubilant Imperial General Headquarters that ordered its armed forces to do battle with the Americans.

The essence of the Imperial General Headquarters plan was simple. The American convoys and carriers were to be given complete freedom in their journey to the Philippine Islands. When they were sufficiently close to make retreat difficult, the main strength of the Japanese Army, Navy, and Air Forces would descend upon them and deliver a knockout blow. If the operation were launched too early, the Americans could annihilate the inferior Japanese air strength before the battle could be fought; if too late, the Americans could escape and the objective would be lost. Imperial General Headquarters, therefore, was “patiently waiting” for the opportune moment.2

the promise of general douglas mc arthur to retake the philippines from japan

the promise of general douglas mc arthur to retake the philippines from japan

The co-ordinated pressure exerted from the north and south on the Japanese forces in the Ormoc area had compelled the commander of the 35th Army to make successive changes in his plans. General Suzuki had abandoned the aerial and ground assault against the Burauen airfields, transferred the field base of the 35th Army from Ormoc to Palompon and, finally, had found it necessary to order the remaining Japanese units on Leyte to retreat to the hills behind Ormoc Valley. General Tomochika said afterward, “The best that the 35th Army could do from then on was to hold out as long as possible  The northwestern mountains of Leyte west of Ormoc Bay provided a difficult barrier to any movement toward the northwest coast. The area was the last one available to the Japanese either for escaping from Leyte or for staging defensive actions. In general, the terrain was rough, increasing in altitude from broken ground and low hills in the north to steep rocky ridges and high hills in the south. The northern part was either under cultivation or covered with cogon grass. Toward the south, the cultivated fields and grasslands were gradually supplanted by dense forests  

General Bruce, “the Division Commander could stand it no longer and called for a plane, flew soon after daylight across the mountains and seaward, located the amphibious forces still at [351]sea, ... witnessed the preparatory fires by the 155-mm. guns and that from the mortar boats ... saw them going in ... and advance to the beach. (He obeyed a rather boyish impulse and flew from 25 to 50 feet above the heads of the troops in the assault boats and leaned out, giving a boxer’s victory sign with both hands.

The troops quickly organized on the beach. A light fast armored column moved north to clear the road and to forestall any Japanese counterattack from that direction as the rest of the task force went rapidly south through the barrio of Look to Palompon, which fell at 1206. This closed the last main port of entrance on the island to the Japanese. Within four hours after hitting the beaches the battalion had secured the barrios of Buaya and Look as well as Palompon, and had strong patrols operating to the northeast and south. The troops met no opposition at any point. It was doubtless with great satisfaction that General Bruce sent the following message to the Commanding General, XXIV Corps: “The 77th Infantry Division’s Christmas contribution to the Leyte Campaign is the capture of Palompon, the last main port of the enemy. We are all grateful to the Almighty on this birthday of the Son and on the Season of the Feast of Lights.”16 The 1st Battalion received “warm congratulations and thanks” from General Krueger.17

The 1st Battalion occupied a defensive position in the vicinity of Look on 25 December, and rested on 26 December, which was Christmas Day back home. It spent the next five days sending out patrols and awaiting the arrival through the mountains of the rest of the 305th Infantry. On 30 December, Company C made a reconnaissance in force and an amphibious landing at Abijao, about seven miles north of Palompon. The company overcame some Japanese resistance and burned down the town to prevent its reoccupation. It then pushed 1,300 yards north and established radio contact with elements of the 1st Cavalry Division, which had pushed through the mountains to the vicinity of Villaba.

ECONOMY DURING THE return of gen douglas mc arthur

General MacArthur had directed General Eichelberger’s Eighth Army to be prepared to assume control of nearly all Sixth Army units in the Leyte area at 0001 on 26 December 1944 in order to relieve the Sixth Army for future operations. The Eighth Army was to relieve the Sixth of all duties and missions in the area except certain ones dealing with logistics and construction. These were assigned to the USASOS (SWPA). The Allied Naval and Air Forces were directed to continue, in support of the Eighth Army, the missions which hitherto had been specified for the Sixth

Assembly of Japanese Forces

On 25 December 1944, General Yamashita, commanding the 14th Area Army, [362]notified General Suzuki, the 35th Army commander, that he had written off the Leyte Campaign as a loss; henceforward the 35th Army on Leyte would be self-sustaining and self-supporting, the units on Leyte would be transferred to other areas, and, finally, the units on the island would be assembled at a point from which raiding operations could be conducted. Since these orders were ambiguous and apparently contradictory, General Suzuki asked that the message be repeated but he never received an answer. Accordingly, in the latter part of December, he sent his chief of staff to Manila for further clarification of the orders. The chief of staff arrived at Manila, by way of Cebu, in late January, but he was unable to obtain any further information for General Suzuki.

he decision of General Yamashita to abandon the Leyte operation followed a series of rapidly moving events. On the 14th of December, he canceled an optimistic plan for an amphibious assault through the shallow waters of Carigara Bay against Carigara, an assault that had been scheduled for 16 December. This cancellation followed the sighting of an Allied convoy en route to Mindoro.5 The convoy reached Mindoro and the troops landed successfully on 15 December. On 19 December, two days prior to the junction of the X and XXIV Corps on Highway 2, General Yamashita told General Suzuki that he could no longer send any reinforcements and supplies to Leyte and that the 35th Army would have to become self-supporting. On the same day, General Yamashita assigned to the defense of Luzon three divisions that Imperial General Headquarters had earmarked for Leyte. Shortly afterward, at a conference with representatives from the Southern Army and Imperial General Headquarters, the representative from the latter told General Yamashita to forget the Leyte operation.

he Japanese Retreat

The morale and physical condition of the Japanese Army were very low. With the juncture of the American X and XXIV Corps, the 35th Army had begun to disintegrate. Desertion became common. The wounded would not assemble with their units. The problem of the wounded became serious since there were no proper facilities for medical treatment. General Tomochika later said: “Commanders employing persuasive language frequently requested seriously wounded soldiers at the front to commit suicide; this was particularly common among personnel of the 1st Division and it was pitiful. However the majority died willingly. Only Japanese could have done a thing like this and yet I could not bear to see the sight

 Neutralizing, in coordination with carrier and land-based aircraft of the THIRD FLEET, hostile naval and air forces in areas within range in the PHILIPPINE ARCHIPELAGO, intensifying the neutralization in the western VISAYAS and MINDANAO areas

Although many of the Philippine Islands suffered extensive damage in World War II, Mindanao emerged relatively unscathed. As the chief frontier left in the difficult reconstruction years, it was the object of government colonization projects. During the 1960s it experienced a phenomenal population increase and very rapid development. These changes brought serious problems. The native Moros, finding themselves outnumbered and in many cases pushed off their lands, retaliated with terrorist activities. When the Philippine army attempted to restore order, fierce fighting often resulted. In 1969 and the early 1970s several thousand people were killed and hundreds of villages were burned.

over the blue skies of Bukidnon and Davao, the emerald green forest down below seemed dark and impenetrable

Mindanao

the contribution of primary agricultural crops produced in Northern Mindanao to its economy and food security of people with the situational analysis and insights of the authors. Rice as the staple food of most Filipinos is insufficient in quantity produced. Corn production is more than enough for the total regional demand. White corn is preferred as secondary staple food, however the corn industry emphasizes yellow corn production and the bulk of this goes to raw materials for livestock and poultry feeds. Coconut, sugar, pineapple and bananas significantly contribute to agricultural exports. Coconut is processed before exporting which can offer employment in the rural areas. Sugarcane, pineapple and bananas have created a change in the land use and hence compete with rice and corn. Northern Mindanao is one of the leading producers of tomatoes, carrots and potatoes, yet farmers have encountered deterring factors in attaining potential income from these products. Although Bukidnon province is the top agricultural producer in the region, poverty in the area remains high. 

The colonization of the Philippines by foreign powers, until the country was granted its independence by the United States in 1946, had shaped the social and political system of the nation and consequently influenced the use and management of its natural resources including land. This had resulted in unequal distribution of the country’s wealth among Filipinos and until now the disparity of land ownership prevails. Landlordism characterized the country’s land ownership and in this feudalistic system the farmers working on landlord lands became tenants and their children after them generation after generation (14).The opening up of large areas in Mindanao through logging and/for agriculture paved the way for migrants to establish resettlements and cultivate the soil. In Bukidnon, this forced the integration of the natives into the dominant community. Those who followed a different path had to move deeper into the forests and the areas they vacated were occupied and titled under the names of the settlers

The country’s agriculture industry was made visible to the outside world during the Spanish colonization when Filipino farmers produced agricultural crops like tobacco (Nicotiana tabacum, Linn.), abaca (Musa textilis, Nee), coffee (Coffea spp.) and spices for export (14). Agriculture, fishery and forestry sector employ most of the rural workforce. In 2006, agriculture employment in Northern Mindanao was estimated to be 47% of the region’s total workforce (17) and in 2012 it still absorbed 43% of the total employment (1). Recent employment has shifted towards services. Modernization of the Philippine agriculture had started for a long time, however the food security of people remains an important issue. From 2006 to 2012, poverty incidence among Filipino families remained unchanged 

the status of production of rice (Oryza sativa, Linn.), corn (Zea mays, Linn.), coconut (Cocos nucifera, Linn.), pineapple (Ananas comosus, Linn. Merr.), bananas (Musa sapientum, Linn.), commercial vegetables and root crops and their contribution to the regional economy and food security in Northern Mindanao. It also presents the strengths and potentials of its agricultural crop production and the underlying issues and concerns. Information gathered on this topic depicts two opposing scenarios. First, crop production significantly contributes to the flourishing economy of Northern Mindanao. Second, although agriculture is a major contributor to the rising economy, poverty is still prevalent and thus threatens the people’s security on food. These two antagonizing situations of the Northern Mindanao economy have to be reconciled. The “trickle down” effects of economic gains should be felt by the majority for regional development to be effective. Balanced information is needed in order to draw a clear picture of how crop production has supported the household economy of Northern Mindanao and to find a common ground for better recommendations in development planning

7b-a Third Republic of the Philippines

////////////////////

Third Republic

he Third Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated on July 4, 1946. It marked the culmination of the peaceful campaign for Philippine Independence—the two landmarks of which were the enactment of the Jones Law in 1916 (in which the U.S. Congress pledged independence for the Philippines once Filipinos have proven their capability for self-government) and the Philippine Independence Act of 1934 (popularly known as Tydings-McDuffie) which put in place a ten-year transition period during which the Philippines had Commonwealth status. The Third Republic also marked the recognition by the global community of nations, of the nationhood of the Philippines—a process that began when the Commonwealth of the Philippines joined the Anti-Axis Alliance known as the United Nations on June 14, 1942, receiving recognition as an Allied nation even before independence.

Thus, the inauguration of the Third Republic marked the fulfillment of the long struggle for independence that began with the Philippine Revolution on August 23, 1896 (recent scholarship suggests, on August 24) and which was formalized on June 12, 1898 with the Proclamation of Philippine Independence at Kawit, Cavite.

From 1946 to 1961, Independence Day was celebrated on July 4. On May 12, 1962, President Diosdado Macapagal issued Proclamation No. 28, s. 1962, which declared June 12 as Independence Day. In 1964, Congress passed Republic Act No. 4166, which formally designated June 12 of every year as the date on which we celebrate Philippine independence. July 4 in turn has been observed as Republic Day since then.

The Roxas Administration (May 28, 1946 – April 15, 1948)

President Manuel Roxas, in his first State of the Nation Address, detailed the challenges the country was facing in the aftermath of war: A government “without financial means to support even its basic functions,”^[1] scarcity in commodities especially of food, hyperinflation, the “tragic destruction”^[2] of a productive economy, and still-ongoing rehabilitation among the different sectors of society.

In an effort to solve the massive socio-economic problems of the period, President Roxas reorganized the government, and proposed a wide-sweeping legislative program. Among the undertakings of the Third Republic’s initial year were: The establishment of theRehabilitation Finance Corporation (which would be reorganized in 1958 as the Development Bank of the Philippines);^[3] the creation of the Department of Foreign Affair and the organization of the foreign service through Executive Order No. 18; the GI Bill of Rights for Filipino veterans; and the revision of taxation laws to increase government revenues.^[4]

President Roxas moved to strengthen sovereignty by proposing a Central Bank for the Philippines to administer the Philippine banking system^[5] which was established by Republic Act No. 265.

In leading a “cash-starved^[6] government” that needed to attend a battered nation, President Roxas campaigned for the parity amendment to the 1935 Constitution. This amendment, demanded by the Philippine Trade Relations Act or the Bell Trade Act,^[7] would give American citizens and industries the right to utilize the country’s natural resources in return for rehabilitation support from the United States. The President, with the approval of Congress, proposed this move to the nation through a plebiscite.

The amendment was necessary to attract rehabilitation funds and investments at a time when public and official opinion in the United States had swung back to isolationism (the Cold War, and a corresponding reversal in what had been heretofore a return of isolationism, would only come a few years later). On March 11, 1947, a total of 432,933 (78.89% of the electorate) voted in favor of the parity amendment.^[8] The approval of the amendment had provided the nation with $620 million^[9] in war damage compensation, through the Philippine War Damage Commission.

A major initiative arising from preliminary wartime discussions about the future security of the Philippines, was the US–Philippine Military Bases Agreement of 1947, which gave the United States the right to retain the use of sixteen bases, free of rent, with the option to use seven more for a term of 99 years.^[10]

The Roxas administration also pioneered the foreign policy of the Republic. Vice President Elpidio Quirino was appointed Secretary of Foreign Affairs. General Carlos P. Romulo, as permanent representative^[11] of the Philippines to the United Nations, helped shape the country’s international identity in the newly established stage for international diplomacy and relations. During the Roxas administration, the Philippines established diplomatic ties with foreign countries and gained membership to international entities, such as the United Nations General Assembly, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Labor Organization (ILO), etc.

On April 15, 1948, following a speech before an audience of assembled airmen at Clark Field Air Base, President Roxas died of a heart attack. Vice President Elpidio Quirino assumed the presidency on April 17, 1948.

The Quirino Administration (April 17, 1948 – December 30, 1953)

President Elpidio Quirino’s goal as chief executive, as stated in his first State of the Nation Address, revolved around strengthening the people’s confidence in the government and the restoration of peace. In order to achieve these, the Chief Executive travelled around the country to inspect firsthand the condition of the nation.

President Quirino established the Action Committee on Social Amelioration through Administrative Order No. 68, in order to efficiently promote the welfare of citizens in the rural districts. He established the Social Security Study Commission by virtue of Executive Order No. 150, to investigate socio-economic problems of the working class and formulate legislation developing social welfare. The Labor Management Advisory Board, established by Executive Order No. 158, formulated labor policies and conducted studies on the ways and means of preventing, minimizing, and reconciling labor disputes. The Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration, established by Republic Act. No. 821, assisted farmers in securing credit as well as developing cooperative associations to efficiently market their agricultural commodities.

The Quirino administration reached out to the leaders and members of Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon (HUKBALAHAP) and thePambansang Kaisahan ng mga Magbubukid (PKM) to negotiate peace and put an end to the insurgency. In 1948, through Proclamation No. 76, the government granted amnesty to the insurgents that surrendered arms. The negotiation failed to persuade HUKBALAHAP leader Luis Taruc and other rebel leaders, as they conceded to register but never disarm. From 1950 to 1953, Secretary of National Defense Ramon Magsaysay and President Quirino exerted efforts in reforming the nation’s Armed Forces and promoting welfare of citizens in the rural areas through the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR)^[12] and Land Settlement and Development Corporation (LASEDECO)^[13]. This resulted to a considerable improvement to the country’s insurgency problem. There were over 25,000 armed communists in early 1950—two thirds of which had either been captured, killed, or had voluntarily surrendered; an estimated 60,000 firearms were surrendered or captured.

The Quirino administration came to a close in the presidential elections of 1953. It was a battle between incumbent Liberal Party of President Elpidio Quirino against the charismatic Nacionalista candidate Ramon Magsaysay. It was a landslide victory for Ramon Magsaysay, who gained 2,912,992 votes or 68.9% of the electorate.

The Magsaysay Administration (December 30, 1953 – March 17, 1957)

To help the rural masses was the focal point of the populist administration^[15] of President Ramon Magsaysay. President Magsaysay insisted in meeting and communicating with his people. In his first Executive Order, he established the Presidential Complaint and Action Commission, which investigated various citizen complaints and recommended remedial actions through different government agencies. The Commission served to boost the nation’s confidence with its government; it was seen as a fulfilment of President Magsaysay’s promise, stated in his inaugural address, to become a President for the people. The principles of the Magsaysay administration were codified in the Magsaysay Credo, and became the theme of leadership and public service.

In the field of international diplomacy and defense, President Magsaysay, through the Manila Pact of 1954 or the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, led the establishment of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO).^[16]

The Laurel-Langley Agreement, signed during the Magsaysay administration, gave the Philippines a preferential trade system^[17] with the United States and other countries. Among its provisions were the right to impose quotas on non-quota articles and the right to impose export taxes.^[18]

On March 17, 1957, President Magsaysay and 25 other passengers of the presidential plane Mt. Pinatubo perished in a crash, at Mt. Manunggal, Cebu. Vice President Carlos P. Garcia succeeded to the presidency on March 18, 1957.

The Garcia Administration (March 18, 1957 – December 30, 1961)

President Carlos P. Garcia, in his inaugural address, sought the help and support of the masses in accomplishing the tremendous responsibilities of the presidency and in carrying on the legacy of the Magsaysay administration. President Garcia used the momentum of the previous administration’s campaign on social welfare and signed the amendment of the Social Security Law through Republic Act 1792, establishing the Social Security System on September 1, 1957.^[19]

President Garcia ran for the presidential elections of 1957. It was the first time in electoral history where there were four serious contenders to the presidency, namely: Jose Yulo, Claro M. Recto, Manuel Manahan, and President Garcia. The incumbent president won the elections with 41.3% of the electorate. It was the first time that a president was elected by plurality of candidates instead of a majority vote. It was also the first time where the elected president and vice president did not come from the same political party—President Garcia was a Nacionalista and Vice President Diosdado Macapagal a Liberal.

The Garcia administration promoted the “Filipino First” policy, whose focal point was to regain economic independence; a national effort by Filipinos to “obtain major and dominant participation in their economy.”^[20] The administration campaigned for the citizens’ support in patronizing Filipino products and services, and implemented import and currency controls favorable for Filipino industries.^[21] In connection with the government’s goal of self-sufficiency was the “Austerity Program,” which President Garcia described in his first State of the NatIon Address as “more work, more thrift, more pro­ductive investment, and more efficiency” that aimed to mobilize national savings.^[22] The Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, through Republic Act No. 301, aimed to prevent corruption, and promote honesty and public trust. Another achievement of the Garcia administration was the Bohlen–Serrano Agreement of 1959, which shortened the term of lease of the US military bases in the country from the previous 99 to 25 years.^[23]

President Garcia lost to Vice President Diosdado Macapagal in the presidential race of 1961.^[24]

The Macapagal Administration (December 30, 1961- December 30, 1965)

President Diosdado Macapagal, during his inaugural address on December 30, 1961, emphasized the responsibilities and goals to be attained in the “new era” that was the Macapagal administration. He reiterated his resolve to eradicate corruption, and assured the public that honesty would prevail in his presidency. President Macapagal, too, aimed at self-sufficiency and the promotion of every citizen’s welfare, through the partnership of the government and private sector, and to alleviate poverty by providing solutions for unemployment.   Among the laws passed during the Macapagal administration were: Republic Act No. 3844 or the Agricultural Land Reform Code (an act that established the Land Bank of the Philippines)^[25]; Republic Act No. 3466, which established the Emergency Employment Administration; Republic Act No. 3518, which established the Philippine Veterans Bank; Republic Act No. 3470, which established the National Cottage Industries Development Authority (NACIDA) to organize, revive, and promote the establishment of local cottage industries; and Republic Act No. 4156, which established the Philippine National Railways (PNR) to operate the national railroad and tramways. The administration lifted foreign exchange controls as part of the decontrol program in an attempt to promote national economic stability and growth.

The Marcos Administration (December 30, 1965 – February 25, 1986)

The last president of the Third Republic of the Philippines was President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Prior to the events of Martial Law, the first term of the Marcos administration, as emphasized in his inaugural address on December 30, 1965, focused on “the revival of the greatness of the nation.”

President Marcos, faced with the challenge of corruption in the government, reorganized the Armed Forces, the Philippine Constabulary, and the Bureau of Internal Revenue. In an attempt to solve the problem of technical smuggling, the Bureau of Customs was also reorganized. The administration, with a goal to strengthen the local economy, devised construction programs and irrigation projects. The promotion of Philippine heritage, culture, and arts was achieved through the establishment of the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) in 1969.^[27]

Under the Marcos administration, the country hosted the Manila Summit in 1966. The conference aimed to resolve the Vietnam War, and sought the restoration of peace and the promotion of economic stability and development throughout the Asia-Pacific region.^[28]

Among the laws approved by President Marcos were: Republic Act No. 5186 or the Investments Incentives Act; Republic Act No. 4864 or the Police Act of 1966; and Republic Act No. 5173, which established the Philippine Coast Guard.

President Marcos won his re-election bid in the 1969 presidential elections against Liberal Party’s Sergio Osmeña Jr. President Marcos gained 5,017,343 votes or 61.47% of the electorate to become only the second Philippine president in history to win reelection and the first to do so in the Third Republic.

On the 30th of January 1970, to protest the violent dispersal of the student-led rally during President Marcos’ fifth State of the Nation Address four days earlier, a demonstration was held in front of Malacañan Palace. This event intensified into a protracted and vicious battle between authorities and the students who tried to storm the palace. A fire truck was rammed into one of the Palace gates; properties were destroyed and fires were started by the rallyists. Two persons were reportedly killed and 106 were injured. The incident and the rallies thereafter became known as the First Quarter Storm, a period of unrest marked by a series of demonstrations against the Marcos administration.^[29]

On November 27 of the same year, Blessed Pope Paul VI traveled to the Philippines, attending to the 63.2 million Filipino Catholic faithful. It marked the first time the head of the Catholic church visited the country. Surviving an assassination attempt upon his arrival, the Pontiff continued his Philippine visit. He officiated the first Papal Mass in the Far East at the Manila Cathedral, as well as an open-air mass at the Rizal Park. [Learn more about papal visits to the Philippines.]

As opposition to President Marcos grew significantly due to corruption in the administration, the Liberal Party then saw an opportunity in the midterm elections of 1971. The Miting de Avance of the Liberal Party held at Plaza Miranda on August 21, 1971 was cut short when two bombs were hurled at the opposition candidates, killing nine people and injuring about a hundred.^[30] Because of this incident, President Marcos suspended the Writ of Habeas Corpus, leading to the arrest and incarceration of twenty people.

The Plaza Miranda bombing, alongside the increasing strength of the Communist Party of the Philippines and its military wing, the New People’s Army, and the Marcos-staged ambush on the convoy of Secretary of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile on the night of September 22, 1972, were the pretext for Marcos’ declaration of Martial Law on September 23, 1972, by virtue of Proclamation No. 1081. The said proclamation was dated September 21, when in fact it was only put into effect on September 23.

7b-1a The nation during Elpidio Quirino’s presidency, 1948 to 1953

//////////

The nation during Elpidio Quirino’s presidency, 1948 to 1953

nd President of the Republic: succession from vice-presidency. 

Elpidio Quirino is one of the least known among Philippine presidents as time moves on. He succeeded to the presidency unexpectedly when Manuel A. Roxas, the first president, died on the third year of his four-year term.

Quirino’s presidency was eventful and positive for the nation. He won a close election on his own in 1949. His accomplishments do not match the low reputation that is associated with his presidency.

Fate is often cruel when historic times lead to the appearance on the scene of more dynamic personalities. Ramon Magsaysay, the third president, is a more remembered figure, though he was president for even a shorter period, less than three years. (He was killed in a plane crash.)

The most important achievements of Magsaysay happened when he was Quirino’s defense secretary. In that post, Magsaysay broke the back of the communist Huk rebellion, capturing the members of the central politburo and committing them to jail.

Thus, the early communist threat to the young republic was reduced to a manageable distraction in subsequent years even beyond the Quirino years.

In his day, Quirino was highly vilified by a virulent press, making his administration look corrupt when it was quite effective in its pursuit of goals. He was ridiculed for choices he probably was not fully aware of, two expensive items in the Malacanang household as it was being renovated – a new bed and an orinola.

Very eventful times. When the Republic was inaugurated in 1946 with Quirino as vice-president, the Philippine economy had been devastated. Gross output was 30 per cent of the 1940 GDP. Agriculture and industry were either in a state of injury or devastation.

When he took over as president in 1948, the economy was on course for a rapid recovery, helped along by continuing large US (military) expenditure at the end of the war and by US rehabilitation assistance in the form of war damage payments.

America’s version of Marshall plan (not so-called because of very special political and economic relations) was the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1947. This US law enabled the appropriation of $520 million for the rehabilitation of the economy – to finance the restoration of destroyed public infrastructure facilities and to award war damage payments for the rehabilitation of properties and businesses destroyed.

(For those who think today this amount of dollar aid was small, consider this. The purchasing power of the dollar of 1940 that was used to evaluate the war damage is worth at least 15 times that of the US dollar of 2015.)

War damage payments helped to speed up the rehabilitation of the economy. These payments contributed immensely to economic rebuilding and to new development. Being quickly disbursed payments within a period of three years until 1950, they provided direct income flows to the recipients.

Economic imbalances. The beginnings of macroeconomic imbalances happened during Quirino’s time. Tax revenues and other government receipts were not enough to cover the large expenditure on rehabilitation and development. Foreign grants (mostly US payments) helped to fill the gap.

Despite the abundance of American economic expenditures and aid, the demand for foreign goods far outstripped the country’s inflows of dollar resources. The magnitude of the reconstruction plus the insatiable want to restore peace time levels of consumption produced this imbalance.

The exchange rate, pegged at the old pre-war and pre-independence value of two to one, also encouraged excessive spending. At about this time, in 1949, the newly created Central Bank opened its doors and the governor (the former secretary of Finance), Miguel Cuaderno, recommended the imposition of import controls.

Later, as conditions tended to worsen, import controls were assisted by more stringent exchange controls. The uses for the allocation of dollars had to be prioritized.

Investments and export recovery. Investments and recovery were helped however by the heavy inflows of assistance from the US.

Infrastructure reconstruction was rapid. Public edifices destroyed by the war were rebuilt with public war damage money. Major roads and bridges, ports and school-buildings were restored. Public utilities were restored.

Private housing and business investments were stimulated by the war damage payments. Damaged businesses – in agriculture, industry, manufacturing and commerce – were assisted in part by the quickly disbursed war damage payments.

New domestic infrastructure projects also came into being. Hydroelectric power began to be harnessed. The Ambuklao Dam in Luzon and the Maria Cristina Falls were harnessed to produce electricity.

The country’s major export industries began to recover. The processing of coconut products expanded and many of the sugar mills began to be restored and exports of these products began to recover. Some mining and timber firms resumed production.

During Quirino’s presidency, the country continued to receive support from US development aid and enjoyed the early years of the special relations covering trade adjustment, war damage payments, and an effort to promote domestic industrialization.

The import and exchange controls encouraged businessmen to produce products that replaced imports. The beginnings of industrial import substitution were promoted by the law promoting “new and necessary industries.”

The government also started to undertake mass housing for low and middle income earners. This program was under the People’s Housing Homesite Corp., a forerunner of the National Housing Authority. Thus begun housing projects designed to be amortized by citizens -- Projects 1, 2, 3 and 4 in the Metro Manila area.

The housing displacements during the war and continuous migration to cities haunt us even today. A future in self-financed mass housing was begun during Quirino’s time.

Optimistic future. Although new problems were emerging for the country, there was a lot of optimism in 1953. The economic rehabilitation was carried well forward. New horizons for development were opening up.

In fact, in 1953 the Philippines was well-positioned to become successful in economic development. The country then was the envy of many countries facing postwar reconstruction and development